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Rackers: Rackers: Manifestations of a Reluctance

Manifestations of a Reluctance to Recognize
Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Angotti v. Celotex Corporation'
In this, the last decade of the 20th Century, our judicial system faces an
apocalypse in the guise of asbestos cases. As did the "Apocalyptic beast,"
asbestos rose up "as from the depths of the sea," after having lain dormant for
decades, to plague our industries initially and our judicial system consequentially,2 spreading cancer and asbestosis to thousands of workers along the
way.

I. INTRODUCTION
Asbestos is one of many products which have a once-latent danger now
facing consumers. Our judicial system uses many means to confront these
dangers, including imposing punitive damages on manufacturers. At what
point does a manufacturer's business decisions affect society such that
punitive damages become necessary? This issue is increasingly important in
our highly industrialized and technological society. Angotti v. Celotex Corp.
mandates an in-depth examination of this issue: first, how are jurisdictions
other than Missouri approaching this problem; second, what considerations
affect how punitive damages are used in a products liability setting; third, does
Missouri's approach further these considerations; and finally, what will postCelotex courts in Missouri require to support punitive damages? This Note
addresses all of these questions.
II. FACTS
The plaintiffs, William and Isabella Angotti, brought an action against
Celotex Corporation (Celotex).? Celotex is the successor corporation to the
Philip Carey Company (Philip Carey), and is liable on behalf of Philip

1. 812 S.W.2d 742 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
2. Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Balbos, 578 A.2d 228, 231 (Md. Ct. App. 1990).
According to the Maryland court, over "8,000 asbestos cases ... have been filed in

Maryland since 1980. Although estimates vary, it has been reported that there are as
many as 50,000 asbestos cases pending nationally." Id.
3. Celotex, 812 S.W.2d at 745.
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Carey. 4 William Angotti worked as an insulator of Philip Carey's asbestoscontaining products from 1948 until he retired in 1982. 5
William Angotti learned of the hazards of working with asbestos in 1968,
and began experiencing health problems in 1976.6 In 1982, William Angotti
was diagnosed with asbestosis.7
The plaintiffs sued Celotex for personal injuries suffered by William
Angotti as a result of his work with Philip Carey's asbestos products and for
Isabella Angotti's loss of consortium due to her husband's injury.8 The
Angottis sought actual and punitive damages.9 To obtain punitive damages,
the plaintiffs were required to prove that Philip Carey had "actual knowledge"
of the product's defect and danger, and that Philip Carey "thereby showed
complete indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others." 10
The plaintiffs' evidence regarding punitive damages came primarily from
correspondence and deposition testimony of John Cantlon." From the midforties to 1972, Cantlon served as a consulting actuary for Philip Carey."
In the 1950s Philip Carey received its first asbestos-related workers'
compensation claim. 1 3 Cantlon warned Philip Carey that this "new problem"
would be expensive and needed to be solved.14 Philip Carey received
workers' compensation summary cards from five workers' claims from 1956
to 1961.15 All five claims were made by workers who were exposed to

4. Id.
5. Id. Angotti worked for Kelly Asbestos from 1951 through 1954, and again
from 1958 to 1960; he worked for Central Insulation in 1959, from 1965 to 1968, and
in 1973. During all of these jobs, Angotti worked with Philip Carey products. Id.
6. Id.

7. Id. Asbestosis is "a progressive and irreversible pulmonary disease caused by
inhaling asbestos fibers. An asbestos victim experiences shortness of breath even
during simple daily activities. Also, an asbestosis victim may suffer from heart
disorder." Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 394 (2d Cir. 1989).
8. Celotex, 812 S.W.2d at 745.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 746 (citing Mo. APPROVED JURY INSTRUcTIONS 10.04 (1991)).
11. Id. at 747.
12. Id. Cantlon first indicated an awareness of the hazards of asbestos in the
1950s, when he told Philip Carey that asbestos was a new and pressing problem that
management should address. Cantlon wrote the Assistant Secretary of Philip Carey,
L.A. Pechstein, in 1962, and advised Pechstein that the company had received ten
claims between 1956 and 1961 based on disabilities claimed due to exposure to
asbestos dust. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss3/11

2

Rackers: Rackers: Manifestations of a Reluctance

1992]

PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTSLIABILITY

1035

asbestos and developed asbestosis. 16 Evidence was also introduced showing
the threshold amount of asbestos to which a worker could be exposed.17
Upon Cantlon's recommendation in 1962, Philip Carey hired Dr. Thomas
Mancuso to study its manufacturing operations. 8 In April of 1963, Cantlon
referred to a report written by Dr. Mancuso concerning the effects of asbestos
exposure and advised Philip Carey that its product would present potential
liability. 9 In May, 1963, Dr. Mancuso warned Philip Carey "that it needed
to develop guidelines and manuals for the benefit of consumers
in regard to
2
safe handling, ventilation and control of dust for its products." 0
In August, 1963, Dr. Mancuso sent medical literature to Philip Carey
concerning the "hazards of asbestos exposure in industrial employment, and
to the surrounding population." 21 Dr. Mancuso also warned Philip Carey that
it was exposing itself to liability not only to employees, but also to all persons
otherwise exposed to asbestos.22
In October, 1963, Philip Carey discontinued its employment of Dr.
Mancuso.23 Philip Carey reached an agreement with Dr. Mancuso by which
his "observations of exposures, sickness and mortality, and [his] evaluation of
[the company's] operations would be kept confidential."'24 '

16. Id. The evidence revealed the following claims: "one claim was disallowed;"
a claim from a man who worked as a utility man and as "a helper on a corrugating
machine" at Philip Carey was allowed; a claim from "a man with asbestosis who
worked dumping asbestos fiber onto a conveyor from a burlap bag" was allowed; a
claim was allowed for a worker with asbestosis who was exposed "to asbestos dust by
asbestos being put in beaters;" and a claim from a worker with asbestosis from
"inhalation of asbestos over a period of time" was allowed. Id.
17. Id. at 747-48.
18. Id. at 748. Dr. Mancuso was a leading expert in the field of occupational
diseases. Id.
19. Id. Cantlon warned Philip Carey that "[t]here is a danger... that a condition
either exists, or the fear of a condition will exist, that will effect not only your
employees, but the employees of companies which purchase your products for use, and
even of customers of your end products." Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. id.
24. Id. Philip Carey determined that Dr. Mancuso's services would not be needed
"until the undertaking of corrective engineering measures and future study of Philip
Carey's health problems indicate the need for his additional services." Cantlon
responded to Philip Carey's decision by advising that he would continue to "keep
Philip Carey informed of information or developments affecting the industry and
company," and that "[i]n Dr. Mancuso's mind, it is definite that there will be
considerable publicity, investigation and scientific, medical and engineering advances,
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In October of 1964, Dr. Mancuso wrote Cantlon about a conference on
asbestos exposure, and noted that asbestos would be a lasting problem which
would expose Philip Carey to legal liability.2 In November, 1964, Philip
Carey rejected Cantlon's suggestion to have Dr. Mancuso continue his
investigation of the harmful effects of asbestos. 26
In a letter written in May,
1966, Dr. Mancuso warned Philip Carey of increasing awareness of the
potential harmful effects of asbestos. 27 Finally, in June, 1967, Cantlon sent
an article to Philip Carey that supported what Dr. Mancuso had been
predicting: "even the minor use of asbestos may someday be considered as
dangerous to the general populace."'
In light of this evidence, the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs.29
William Angotti won $250,000 in actual damages and $250,000 in punitive

all in relation to asbestosis, not only as an occupational hazard, but as a health hazard."
Id. at 748-49.
25. Id. at 749. The letter states in pertinent part:
1. There is now agreement on an International level, from the facts and
evidence presented, that there is an irrefutable association between asbestos
[xxx] [xxx]. At present this association has been established for [xxx] and
of the [xxx] and of the [xxx] (in the form of [xxx]. There is suggestive
evidence but not established for [xxx] -xxx].
2. There is now substantial evidence, that [xxx] [xxx] have developed in
environmentally exposed groups, ie. due to air pollution groups, living near
asbestos plants, and asbestos mining operations, but not occupationally
exposed.
3. Evidence has also been established for [xxx] developing among members
of the household, ie. [sic] relatives of workers who are employed in the
asbestos plants. [xxx] have developed among wives, laundering the work
clothes of asbestos workers.
Id. The bracketed portions with x's represent portions of Mancuso's letter that were
"expunged prior to the letter being admitted in evidence." Id. at 749 n.2. The letter
also contained the following warning: "There should be no delusion, that the problem
will disappear or that the consumer or working population will not become aware of
the problem and the compensation and legal liability involved." Id. at 749.
26. Id.
27. Id. Dr. Mancuso wrote that "[t]he situation that now confronts all industry
users and manufacturers of asbestos products is quite formidable and requires a serious
reappraisal and the development of specific plans of operation." Id. Dr. Mancuso also
advised Philip Carey that he was available to consult with Philip Carey "if it Was ready
or interested in some serious discussion relative to their overall medical and related
activities." Id.
28. Id. at 750.
29. Id. at 745.
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° Isabella Angotti received $25,000 on her loss of consortium
damages.
31
claim.
Celotex appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, 2
contending that the trial court erroneously overruled its directed verdict motion
on the issue of punitive damages.3 3 Celotex argued that its directed verdict
motion should have been granted because the plaintiffs failed to establish that
Angotti had used the defendant's asbestos products during the relevant time
period2' Celotex also argued that the Angottis failed to prove that the
defendant had actual knowledge that its product posed a danger to insulators. The appellate court held that the trial court had erred and that Celotex
was therefore entitled to the directed verdict as to punitive damages? 6

III. LEGAL HISTORY
Missouri courts apply Missouri Approved Instruction (M.A.I.) 10.04 to
instruct juries in a strict products liability claim in which punitive damages are
submitted.3 Missouri Approved Instruction 10.04 requires that in a products
liability case based upon a product containing a manufacturing or design
defect, the jury must find two elements before awarding punitive damages.
First, the jury must find that the defendant manufacturer "knew of the
defective condition and danger [of the product].., at the time defendant sold
the product." Second, the jury must find that "defendant thereby showed
complete indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others."'

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 742.
33. Id. at 746.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 750. Celotex appealed on three other grounds. First, Celotex argued
that it was entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of contributory fault. Id. Celotex
also argued "that the trial court erred in failing to bifurcate the liability issues from the

punitive damage issues." Id. at 751. Finally, Celotex argued "that the trial court erred
in admitting" specific evidence. Id. These contentions were also denied by the
appellate court. Id. at 750-52.
37. Id. at 746.
38. Id. (citing Mo. APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 10.04 (1991)). The plaintiff
is required to prove that defendant knew of the "defective condition and danger" only
when a products liability case is submitted under M.A.I. 25.04. Id. Missouri
Approved Instruction 25.04 is the products liability verdict director to be submitted
when the plaintiff is attempting to prove that the product was sold in a dangerous
condition. Mo. APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 25.04 (1991). When the case is
presented based upon a failure to warn, M.A.I. 25.05 is used as the verdict director.
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The drafters of M.A.I. 10.04 based the instruction on the decision of
Racer v. Utterman.39 In Racer, the plaintiff underwent surgery, during which
she wore an operating drape manufactured by the defendant.'
During
surgery, the plaintiff's surgical drape caught fire from a cautery used to stop
bleeding. 41 Doctors and nurses conducting the operation testified that they
believed that the drape was fire-resistant. 42 The Eastern District of the
Missouri Court of Appeals found that the evidence was sufficient for a jury
to find that the defendant had actual knowledge the drape was flammable. 43
The evidence also supported a finding that the drape would be exposed to fire
during its intended use, and showed the extent of danger the flammability
placed on users of its product. 44
In reviewing this evidence, the court rejected the use of M.A.I. 10.02 as
the appropriate instruction for a punitive damages award in a case based upon
strict liability. 45 Missouri Approved Instruction 10.02 allows a jury to award
punitive damages if it finds that the defendant's conduct "showed complete
indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others." 4" The court
held that "[i]f plaintiff, in addition to proving the conduct necessary to support
the strict liability claim, can also establish a degree of fault in such conduct
sufficient to justify punitive damages, those damages may also be recovered. 47 Therefore, the court remanded the case and instructed the lower
'
court to determine the extent of the defendant's knowledge of the danger. 4
Knowledge is required by M.A.I. 10.04 because proof of knowledge is
not a requirement to recover under a strict liability claim. 49 By requiring
proof of actual knowledge, the drafters of M.A.I. 10.04 satisfy the require-

Mo. APPROVED JURY INsTRUCrioNs 25.05 (1991). When a case is submitted under
M.A.I. 25.05, M.A.I. 10.04 is again used to submit a claim for punitive damages. Id.
However, the plaintiff is required to prove only that the defendant had knowledge of
the "danger" of the product. Id.
39. Committee Comment, Mo. APPROVED JURY INsTRUCTIONS 10.04 (1991).
40. Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
41. Id. at 392.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 393-94.
44. Id. at 396.
45. Id.
46. Mo.

APPROVED JURY INSTRUCMTONS

10.02 (1991).

47. Racer, 629 S.W.2d at 396.
48. Id.
49. Hoover's Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-America Dairymen, 700 S.W.2d 426, 436-37
(Mo. 1985).
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ments of Racer: a finding of reckless conduct sufficient to justify an award
of punitive damages. 50
Missouri courts have narrowly interpreted M.A.I. 10.04.51 Courts have
held that the knowledge required by M.A.I. 10.04 is "actual knowledge."5 2
No Missouri court has submitted an M.A.I. 10.04 punitive damage instruction
in a products liability case based on the theory that the defendant "should have
known" of the dangers of its product 3
Missouri courts have been reluctant to uphold an award of punitive
damages in a products liability case. One exception is Wolf v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co. 4 Wolf was inflating a tire when a portion of the wheel, a

50. Id. at 437.
51. See Racer, 629 S.W.2d at 387; see also School Dist. of Independence v.
United States Gypsum Co., 750 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Love v. Deere &
Co., 684 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Sparks v. Consol. Aluminum Co., 679
S.W.2d 348 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Lewis v. Envirotech Corp., 674 S.W.2d 105 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1984).
Prior to Celotex, perhaps the best example of the reluctance of Missouri courts
to affirm punitive damages occurred in School District of Independence v. United
States Gypsum Co., 750 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). In Gypsum, the trial court
had determined that a defendant asbestos corporation did not have actual knowledge
of the danger of the asbestos that the defendant had placed in plaintiff's school. Id.
at 446. To attempt to establish defendant's "actual knowledge of the defect and
danger" of the asbestos product, the plaintiff introduced testimony from an expert in
lung diseases. Id. at 447. The court summarized the expert's testimony as follows:
[The expert,] acting on his own and without funding [from the defendant]
performed experiments in which he exposed laboratory animals to
combinations of asbestos and gypsum. During that year he showed the
experiments to Edward Beuthine, [defendant's] then safety manager. [The
expert] described the "bad results" obtained from combining asbestos in
various compounds, the "bad results" being asbestosis, emphysema, and
proliferation of epithelial tissues in the lungs. Later, having learned from
an advertisement that [the defendant] was marketing a new product which
combined gypsum and asbestos, [the expert] wrote to [the defendant]
protesting the "folly" of adding asbestos to gypsum, noting his experiments.
Id.
The court determined that while the defendant had knowledge "of [the expert's]
experiments and opinions concerning the potential danger of incorporating asbestos
into gypsum products," the plaintiff introduced no evidence "of the validity of [the
expert's] experiments, nor of the methods by which the experiments were conducted."
Id. Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiff's expert's testimony did not establish
actual knowledge on the part of defendant. Id.
52. Gypsum, 750 S.W.2d at 446 (citing Lewis, 674 S.W.2d at 114).
53. Id.
54. 808 S.W.2d 868 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
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multi-piece rim, came apart and injured him. 55 Wolf sued the manufacturer
for negligent design and negligent failure to warn.56 The plaintiff introduced many of the defendant's intra-office memos. One memo warned of the
importance of a program that educated users "of potential safety problems
resulting from improper tire servicing.157 Another memo discussed the
development of a multiple-piece rim that would not come loose during
inflation.' A third memo urged for the implementation of a safety program
concerning the danger of rims.59 Wolf also introduced evidence of presentations in which the defendant explained how a new one-piece rim was safer
than the multi-piece rim, because it would "eliminate' 6 cases where tire
changers are hurt due to rings separating from rim bases."
The Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals was persuaded by
this evidence and found that the defendant knew of the danger that their multipiece rim posed to consumers.61 Therefore, the court upheld the jury award
of punitive damages.62 Wolf is an exception, however, to the tradition of
Missouri
courts reversing awards of punitive damages in products liability
3
6

cases.

IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case the court conceded that the plaintiffs had proven
64
exposure to defendant's asbestos product during the relevant time period.
However, the court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to establish that Philip Carey
had actual knowledge that asbestos posed a danger to insulators such as
Angotti.65
The court concluded that evidence regarding workers involved in the
manufacturing process who were exposed to "high volumes of asbestos dust"
and who later contracted asbestosis was insufficient to establish that Philip
Carey had actual knowledge of asbestos' dangers to insulators." The court

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 870.
Id. at 872.
Id.
Id at 872-73.
Id. at 873.
Id.

61. Id.

62.
63.
S.W.2d
64.
65.
66.

Id.
See, e.g., Racer, 629 S.W.2d 387; Gypsum, 750 S.W.2d 442; Love, 684
70; Sparks, 679 S.W.2d 348; Lewis, 674 S.W.2d 105.
Celotex, 812 S.W.2d at 747.
Id. at 746-47.
Id. at 748.
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found that Cantlon's testimony that he had advised Philip Carey to be
"cautious" and "to develop guidelines for safe handling" established that Philip
Carey and Cantlon believed that asbestos could be handled safely.6'
The court found Cantlon's repeated warnings that asbestos manufacture
caused a dangerous condition were insufficient to prove that Philip Carey had
actual knowledge or could have had actual knowledge that asbestos was
dangerous to insulators." In addition, Cantlon's forecast that Philip Carey
was exposing itself to liability by manufacturing asbestos did not prove that
the company actually knew that asbestos was dangerous to insulators.6 9
Further, the court found that Philip Carey's intent "to keep Dr. Mancuso's
observations and evaluation confidential" did not prove that it had actual
knowledge. 7° The court also concluded that the opinion that "considerable
advances" toward a recognition of the hazards of asbestos would be made, the
warning that the potential hazards of asbestos "will not disappear," and
knowledge that the public would become increasingly
aware of the hazards of
7
asbestos did not establish actual knowledge. 1
Finally, the court determined that warnings of potential effects of asbestos
exposure and a forecast of asbestos' future were insufficient to establish that
Philip Carey had actual knowledge that asbestos represented a hazard to
insulators.2 The court found not only that the plaintiffs failed to prove such
actual knowledge, but they also had not established that Philip Carey
consciously disregarded information about asbestos' dangers to insulators.7 3
The court held that Philip Carey did not have actual knowledge that
asbestos posed a health hazard to insulators such as Angotti.74 Therefore, the
court reversed the punitive damages award.75
In his dissent, Judge Kennedy stated that the majority's decision required
"specific, exact and certain knowledge" rather than actual knowledge.7 6
According to Kennedy, this requirement was inconsistent with previous
Missouri cases7n

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 749.
Id.
Id. at 750.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 752.
Id.
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Kennedy found that the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to prove that
Philip Carey had actual knowledge of asbestos' hazardous effects. 7 From
this finding, Kennedy believed that a jury could reasonably infer that asbestos
was dangerous to workers such as Angotti, who were involved in "handling,
cutting, and sawing the material and freeing the asbestos fibers into the air in
enclosed spaces." 79 Kennedy also noted that it could have been found that
Philip Carey's conduct was in "complete indifference to or conscious disregard
for the safety of others," and therefore met the second prong of M.A.I.
10.04'.' Hence, Kennedy stated that the jury's award of punitive damages
should have been upheld by the court.81
V. COMMENT

A. Approaches of Other Jurisdictionsto the
Punitive Damages Problem
Punitive damages are not a modern tool invented to combat industry; they
have been traced as far back as 2000 B.C. in the Code of Hammurabi.Z The
development of punitive damages was based upon a need to punish and deter
individual criminals, such as trespassers and oxen thieves.8 3 The application
of this device to industrial society has resulted in a variety of awkward
practical situations8

78. Id. at 753.

79. Id.
80. Id.

81. Id. at 752.
82. David G. Owen, Problems in AssessingPunitive DamagesAgainstManufacturers ofDefective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1982).
83. Id. at 15.

84. Id. Owen cites a few of these practical problems:
Final "decisions" concerning a complex product are often the result of a
splintered, bureaucratic process involving a complicated combination of
human judgments made by scores of persons at different levels in the
hierarchy who pass on different aspects of the problem at different times.
Various engineers may have to rely upon the work of research chemists,
physicists, and other scientists; input from financial and marketing arms of
the enterprise must be factored in along the way. The entire process may
take years. Each of these human actors makes decisions based on his own
motives and on different types and amounts of information, and even the
responsible executive at the end of the decisional line can possess only a
small bit of the total information involved. Moreover, the corporate owners
of the enterprise are usually far removed from most decisions of even the
top executives.
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The watershed case in products liability for the award of punitive
damages is Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.8s In Grimshaw, the plaintiff was

injured when the Ford Pinto in which he was a passenger was rear-ended by
another car.86 When the other car struck the Pinto, the Pinto's gas tank
ruptured and caused an explosion."7
The plaintiff brought suit against Ford on a strict liability cause of
action.' The jury awarded the plaintiff $125 million in punitive damages,
but the award was remitted by the trial court to $3.5 million8 9 Ford
appealed the punitive damages award on the ground that it "was statutorily
unauthorized," "constitutionally invalid," supported by insufficient evidence,
and excessive. 90
The plaintiff was required by California law to prove that the defendant
was guilty of malice to recover punitive damages. 9' California courts have
interpreted the malice required for a punitive damage award as showing "a
conscious disregard of the probability that the actor's conduct will result in
injury to others."'
In upholding the punitive damages award, the California Court of Appeal
focused upon tests conducted by Ford that showed Ford's knowledge of the
dangerous condition of the Pinto's gas tank.93 The plaintiff introduced
evidence of Ford's crash tests which showed "that the Pinto's fuel tank...
would expose consumers to serious injury or death in a... collision." 94 The
court found that there was evidence that "Ford could have corrected the
hazardous design defects at minimal cost."95 However, Ford decided against
taking safety precautions after conducting a cost-benefit analysis that balanced
the risk to consumers against the profit the Pinto would generate.'

Id. (citation omitted).
85. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981). See Owen, supra note 82. Professor
Owen calls Grimshaw demonstrative of the "assimilation of the punitive damages
remedy into the field of products liability." Id. at 3.
86. Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
87. Id.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 362-63.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 380.
Id. at 381 (quoting Dawes v. Superior Ct., 168 Cal. Rptr. 319, 319-22 (Ct.

App. 1980)).

93. Id. at 384.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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Ford contended that because the plaintiff did not introduce evidence to
prove that Ford had ratified malicious conduct, it was not liable for punitive
damagesY. In rejecting this argument, the court noted that evidence showed
that several Ford employees were aware of the report. 98 While the court
admitted that the evidence was circumstantial, it concluded that a "jury could
reasonably find that Ford's management decided to proceed with the
production of the Pinto with knowledge of test results revealing design defects
which rendered the fuel tank extremely vulnerable on rear impact at low
speeds and endangered the safety and lives of the occupants."" Such a
finding, the court concluded, was sufficient to show malice on the part of
Ford. 1' ° Hence, the court upheld the punitive damages award.'
Since Grimshaw, most jurisdictions have required plaintiffs seeking
punitive damages in a products liability case to prove that a defendant had
some level of knowledge of the danger of its product."° Most jurisdictions

97. Id.
98. Id. at 385.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 399.
102. Examples of required conduct include: "wanton or reckless," Racich v.
Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying New York state law);
"maliciousness" or "an intentional or willful failure to inform or act," Wilkert "v.
Northern Sand & Gravel, Inc., 402 N.W.2d 178, 183 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987);
"consciously, i.e. knowingly, indifferent to [plaintiff's] rights, welfare and safety,"
Glasscock v. Armstrong Cork Co., 946 F.2d 1085, 1093 (5th Cir. 1991); "a high
degree of moral culpability.., which manifests a 'conscious disregard of the rights
of others or conduct so reckless as to amount to such disregard,"' Home Ins. Co. v.
American Home Prods. Corp., 550 N.E.2d 930, 934 (N.Y. 1990) (citation omitted)
("[s]uch conduct need not be intentionally harmful but may consist of actions which
constitute willful or wanton negligence or recklessness."); "egregious" conduct, Fischer
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 472 A.2d 577, 581 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984), aft'd,
512 A.2d 466 (N.J. 1986) (such conduct is egregious if it is "a deliberate act or
omission with knowledge of a high degree of probability of harm and reckless
indifference to consequences"); "grossly negligent or recklessly indifferent to the rights
of others," Johnson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 797 F.2d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir.
1986) (applying Kansas state law); "reckless disregard for the safety of product users,
consumers or others who were injured by the product," Ames v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 514 A.2d 352, 359 (Conn. Ct. App. 1986); "an intentional, wilful wanton
oppressive and malicious manner," Croteau v. Olin Corp., 644 F. Supp. 208, 213
(D.N.H. 1986) (applying New Hampshire law); "specific knowledge of a product
defect and its potential for harm," Nigh v. Dow Chem. Co., 634 F. Supp. 1513, 1516
(W.D. Wis. 1986) (citing Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 444 (1980))
(applying Wisconsin state law); "guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice," In re Related
Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152, 1157 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (applying California state
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require proof that a defendant's conduct was "willful, wanton, malicious,
conscious, or [in] reckless disregard of the rights of others."'1 3 While these
jurisdictions place emphasis on the intent of the manufacturer, these traditional
standards differ from M.A.I. 10.04 in that they require a subjective analysis
of the defendant's conduct. 1' 4
A few jurisdictions, like Missouri, differ from the majority approach and
require proof of a more objective level of knowledge on behalf of the
defendant to obtain punitive damages in a products liability case.' 0 5 Many
courts requiring proof of the defendant's knowledge have upheld an award of
punitive damages. For example, in Fischerv. Johns-Manville Corp., a New
Jersey court was confronted with many of the same factual issues as the

law); "reckless disregard for the public safety," Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus., 661
P.2d 515, 518 (Okla. 1983); "willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness or
oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a
conscious indifference to consequences." Wammock v. Celotex Corp., 835 F.2d 818,
822 (11th Cir. 1988) (applying Georgia law).
103. Owen, supra note 82, at 21.
104. See, e.g., David G. Owen, PunitiveDamagesin ProductsLiabilityLitigation,
74 MICH.L. REV. 1257, 1365-66 (1976). One court has described this article as a
"signal event" which persuaded many jurisdictions to determine that there is "neither
a conceptual nor a public policy bar to the allowance of punitive damages in products
liability actions." Fischer, 472 A.2d at 582.
105. For example, in Maryland, "[w]anton or reckless conduct" consisting of
"direct evidence of substantial knowledge on the part of the manufacturer that the
product is, or is likely to become, dangerous, and a gross indifference to that danger"
will support an award of punitive damages. Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Balbos, 578 A.2d
228, 258-59 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990). According to the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals, "Under this standard, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant conducted
himself in an extraordinary manner characterized by a wanton or reckless disregard for
the rights of others." Id. at 259.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that in a failure-to-warn case in which
strict liability is applied, punitive damages are available upon proof that "a manufacturer is (1) aware of or culpably indifferent to an unnecessary risk of injury, and (2)
refuses to take steps to reduce that danger to an acceptable level." Fischer,512 A.2d
at 480. The court held that the standard could be "met by a showing of a deliberate
act or omission with knowledge of a high degree of probability of harm and reckless
indifference to consequences." Id. (quoting Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., 181 A.2d
487, 496 (N.J. 1962)).
Florida also requires that a plaintiff in a products liability case show that
defendant "have knowledge that its product is inherently dangerous to persons or
property and that its continued use is likely to cause injury or death, but nevertheless
continues to market the product without making feasible modifications to eliminate the
danger or making adequate disclosure and warning of such danger." Johns-Manville
Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242, 249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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Missouri Court of Appeals was in Celotex.'06 Like William Angotti, the
plaintiff, James Fischer, had handled asbestos as an employee of the
defendant.10 7 As in Celotex, the plaintiffs, Fischer and his wife, were
required to prove that the defendant-manufacturer had "actual knowledge...
1 8
of the hazards of asbestos during the time of plaintiff's exposure."
In answer to the plaintiffs' interrogatories, the defendant, JohnsManville, admitted that by the early 1930s it had knowledge that a "relationship" existed between asbestos and asbestosis."c
Further, the defendant
acknowledged that by the early 1940s it was aware of the danger asbestos
posed to those involved in the manufacture of the product. 1
The President of the Industrial Health Foundation [Foundation], Dr.
Daniel C. Braun, testified on behalf of the plaintiffs."1 The Foundation, to
which Johns-Manville belonged, conducts extensive research in the area of
occupational diseases. 1 According to Dr. Braun, a collection of articles
published in scientific journals was sent monthly to the Foundation members
beginning in 1937.113 The subject matter of these articles was occupational
disease. 1 4 Evidence presented by the plaintiffs showed that the articles
addressed the dangers of asbestos exposure and various preventative measures
to protect workers from such dangers115
By 1933, asbestos workers had filed claims against Johns-Manville.11 6
The plaintiffs introduced evidence that in November of 1933, the defendant's
executive committee had decided to take affirmative steps toward settling
these and future actions filed by employees against the corporation.11 7 The

106. Fischer,472 A.2d at 580.
107. Id. at 579.
108. Id. at 580.
109. Id. Specifically, the defendant admitted the following:
[T]he corporation became aware of the relationship between asbestos and
the disease known as asbestosis among workers involved in mining, milling
and manufacturing operations and exposed to high levels of virtually 100%
raw asbestos fibers over long periods of time by the early 1930s. The
corporation has followed and become aware of the general state of the
medical art relative to asbestos and its relationship to disease processes, if
any.
Id.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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plaintiffs also introduced evidence that the defendant and representatives of
a rival asbestos supplier met to discuss the risks to which the asbestos industry
was exposed.'
The Fischer court found the "most damning of all" evidence to be the
actions of Sumner Simpson." 9 Simpson served as president of Raybestos,
The editor of Asbestos, the periodical of the
an asbestos supplier.' 2
asbestos industry, wrote to Simpson in October, 1935.1 In the letter, the
editor suggested that, in response to increasing negative publicity asbestos had
been receiving, an article detailing asbestos' positive attributes was necessary.
Simpson then forwarded a copy of the letter to Vandiver Brown,
Simpson stated
the secretary at Johns-Manville." 3 In his letter to Brown,
' 24
that "the less said about asbestos, the better off we are."
In 1941, Brown wrote Simpson in response to a proposal by Asbestos'
editor to publish a book review claiming that pneumonoconiosis was linked
to exposure to asbestos. 5 Brown wrote that many of Asbestos' subscribers
would disfavor such an article. Therefore, he believed that the book review
should not be published.126
Finally, the plaintiffs introduced testimony taken from Dr. Kenneth
Smith. 27 Smith, a physician, was hired by Johns-Manville in 1944; he
served as medical director of Johns-Manville's Canadian corporation."
Smith testified that from the outset of his employment, he regularly saw
employees with asbestosis, and he repeatedly advised Johns-Manville that
these employees receive job reclassifications to avoid asbestos exposure.' 29
After reviewing this evidence, the court found that Johns-Manville "acted
knowingly and deliberately in subjecting [plaintiff James Fischer] as an
30
asbestos worker to serious health hazards" during the relevant time period.

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 581.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 587. The court was persuaded thusly by plaintiff's evidence:
It is indeed appalling to us that Johns-Manville had so much information
on the hazards to asbestos workers as early as the mid-1930s and that it not
only failed to use that information to protect these workers but, more
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The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the punitive damages award, finding
that the plaintiffs' evidence showed that Johns-Manville "actually took
affirmative steps to conceal this information from the public." '
Despite the similarity in evidence between the two cases, Fischer and
Celotex's different results are due to a difference in focus between the two
courts. In Fischer, the court stated that the issue was whether Johns-Manville
had actual knowledge "of the hazards of asbestos" during the time plaintiff
was exposed to asbestos as an employee of defendant."' In Celotex,
however, the court sought a finding on a much more narrow issue: whether
Philip Carey had actual knowledge of the hazards of asbestos to insulators
during the time of William Angotti's exposure.133 The difference in result
is a product of the contrast between these two issues.
B. Policy Considerations UnderlyingPunitive Damages
Missouri courts award punitive damages to advance two policy goals.
First, punitive damages are intended to punish the defendant for misconduct.
Second, punitive damages are used to deter similar misconduct by the
defendant in the future.1M
1. Punishment
Punitive damages punish a defendant in various ways.1 35 First, awarding punitive damages serves to help a plaintiff's emotional state by seeing the
defendant suffer the brunt of punitive damages.136 Second, punishment of
a manufacturer-defendant provides a mechanism for society to get even with
egregiously, that it also attempted to withhold this information from the
public.
Id
Further, the court was persuaded by strong policy considerations:
Johns-Manville was the leader of the Canadian asbestos industry. We are
therefore of the view that the jury could properly have inferred that the
scope and content of Bell's knowledge were the same as Johns-Manville's
and, consequently, that it acted with similar conscious and flagrant disregard
of the safety and health of others. We are satisfied that conduct met the
standard of egregiousness which must underlie a punitive damages award.
Id. at 588.
131. Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 481 (N.J. 1986).
132. Fischer,472 A.2d at 580 (emphasis added).
133. Celotex, 812 S.W.2d at 750.
134. Lewis v. Envirotech Corp. 674 S.W.2d 105, 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
135. Owen, supra note 104, at 1279.
136. Id.
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one who has engaged in misconduct. 3 7 Third, punishing a defendant with
punitive damages serves to reward the law-abider indirectly and reminds
and
138
society.
of
values
legal
the
of
defendant-manufacturer
the
educates
Two questions must be answered to determine whether punitive damages
effectively punish defendant-manufacturers. First, when a court awards
punitive damages in a products liability case, is the manufacturer punished?
Second, when punitive damages are awarded in products a liability case, do
they represent a fair and principled form of punishment? 3 9
In response to the first consideration, one problem with punitive damages
is that their burden is often not shouldered by the actual wrongdoer at a
corporation.4
Instead, the shareholders, who hold little decision-making
41
to absorb the full impact of punitive damages. '
forced
be
power, may
An analysis of the second question reveals a number of inequitable
ramifications of punitive damages in the products liability setting. 142 For
instance, many jurisdictions require a plaintiff to prove "malice or reckless
conduct" by the defendant; such language is awkward when framed against the
conduct of a corporation. 43 Further, such language does not
provide
14
corporate decision-makers with a guideline of acceptable conduct.
In many instances, the wrong being punished is the result of a single
design defect. Allowing more than one plaintiff to recover punitive damages
in these circumstances produces a level of punishment that is inequitable and
unfairly burdensome. 45 Finally, there is concern among commentators that
the defendant's compensatory damages case is unfairly prejudiced when the
plaintiff can seek punitive damages in a strict liability setting.'"

137. Id. at 1280.
138. Id. at 1281. Owen states that "[b]y punishing the law-breaker, society
indirectly rewards the law-abider ....

The punishment of offenders thus reinforces

the confidence of the law-abider in the basic fairness of the legal system and in the
utility of his personal decision to obey the law." Id. Further, Owen states that
"punishment serves as a reformative device to educate the offender to society's legal
values and to allow him to atone for his misdeed through suffering." Id.
139. Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive
Damages in ProductsLiability Litigation, 74 KY. L.J. 1, 40 (1985-1986).

140. Id. at 40-41.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 41.

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.

146. Id.
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2. Deterrence
Punitive damages are also used to deter similar misconduct from
occurring in the future. 147 The ability of a court to deter continued misconduct by a manufacturer depends upon four factors. 14
First, potential wrongdoers must be aware that their contemplated conduct
is forbidden and punishable. 49 Second, avoiding the punishment must be
within the control of the potential wrongdoer. 150 Third, the potential
wrongdoer must want to avoid punishment by altering its conduct."' The
fourth factor
is the extent the manufacturer seeks to avoid such punishable
52
conduct.'

The major argument that punitive damages cannot deter manufacturer
conduct is that such an award is too unpredictable.' 53 This criticism is
bolstered by the variety 5of
ways jurisdictions approach punitive damages in
4
a products liability case.
A second reason punitive damages may not deter corporate misconduct
is due to the traditionally slow process of the civil justice system. 5

147. Owen, supra note 104, at 1283.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.

152. Id. According to Owen, this goal serves as an additional deterrent effect:
[T]he intensity of such a desire in any particular case will depend upon the
manufacturer's perception of the likelihood of his being identified and
punished as well as on the likely severity of punishment. The availability
of punitive damages in products liability cases should make it far more
likely that offending manufacturers will be exposed and punished since the
remedy supplies an additional financial incentive to both the victims and his
attorney to uncover and prove the proscribed behavior.
Id. at 1285.
153. E. Donald Elliot, Why PunitiveDamagesDon'tDeterCorporateMisconduct

Effectively, 40 ALA L. REv. 1053, 1057 (1989). Elliot has summarized how the
unpredictable nature of punitive damages fails in deterring misconduct:
The modem conception of tort law as a regulatory system depends on
predictability, so that the actions taken ex post in one case can be used by
others as ex ante incentives to guide future behavior. From the perspective
of potential tortfeasors, punitive damages are an unguided missile: it may
or may not strike them, but there is very little that potential tortfeasors can
do to alter their risks of punitive damages.
Id.
154. See supra note 102.

155. Elliot, supra note 153, at 1062.
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Products liability cases against corporations are particularly slow, and far too
often a corporation is punished
for manufacturing decisions that were made
6
decades before the suit.u
A third concern is that the deterrent effects of punitive damages may be
diluted by the remote chance that a corporate decision will result in a punitive
damages sanction.u 7 Certainty of punitive damages is essential to efficient
deterrence.s
Finally, while the magnitude of the sanctions increases the deterrent
effect, courts have reduced deterrence by reducing large punitive damages
verdicts.' 9 Further, corporate insurance against punitive damages weakens
the effect on the corporate defendant.' °
C. Do Missouri Courts Further the Goals of Punishment
and Deterrence by their Interpretation
of MA.I. 10.04?
These policy concerns can best be satisfied by focusing upon the "state
of mind" of the defendant-manufacturer.16 ' But what "state of mind" must
a defendant possess to justify punitive damages? Professor Owen answers that
in situations where "a manufacturer intentionally misleads consumers into
believing that its product is safer than it actually is," punitive damages will
usually be appropriate. 16' This situation occurred in Grimshaw: the defendant withheld safety test results from the public that showed its product posed
a danger to consumers; more importantly, the defendant chose to ignore the
safety results after determining that the profit from the product outweighed the
risk it posed to consumers. 63 This is the easy situation; it is clearly the
type of conduct that should be punished and deterred. But what about the
more difficult cases, such as Celotex, in which a manufacturer is seemingly
aware of a potential danger posed to consumers but takes no affirmative steps

156. Id. Elliot attributes the slow nature of such cases to the "adoption of the
'discovery rule' for starting the statute of limitations." Id. Therefore, "it is only a
legal fiction that leads us to consider the corporation to be the 'same person' that
committed the evil acts." Id. at 1063. Elliot compares the effect of punitive damages
under such circumstances to "'corruption of the blood,' the ancient common law
remedy that punished the children for the sins.committed by the parents." Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1065-66.
160. Id.
161. Owen, supra note 100, at 1362.
162. Id.
163. See supra note 96.
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to reduce such danger? Professor Owen calls for a standard of constructive
knowledge in these situations: punitive damages should be awarded where a
plaintiff proves that the defendant was "constructively aware" that its product
posed a danger to "consumers that outweighed the slight cost of taking safety
measures to prevent such risk.' This standard is more narrow than that of
the majority of jurisdictions."
By following a standard that awards
punitive damages only upon a showing of constructive knowledge, a court
ensures that it is punishing and deterring inappropriate conduct.'66
Missouri courts follow Professor Owen in focusing upon the defendant's
"state of mind." The reason for M.A.I. 10.04's focus was explained in Racer,
which held that requiring proof of defendant's knowledge of the product's
danger is necessary to award punitive damages. 67 The proof is required
because it ensures a level of predictability as juries review a products liability
case.' 68 As noted, Missouri courts award punitive damages to punish and
deter defendants.1 69 By requiring a court to find sufficient fault-actual
knowledge-a court ensures that the goals of punishment and deterrence are
sufficiently met by the jury. However, the drafters of M.A.I. 10.04 differed
from Professor Owen's standard by requiring proof of actual rather than
constructive knowledge.
Does Missouri's "actual knowledge" requirement therefore ensure that the
policy goals of punitive damages are being attained by Missouri courts?
Professor Owen identifies two problems with requiring a plaintiff to prove that
a defendant had "actual knowledge" of the danger or defect of its product. 7 '
First, Professor Owen maintains that the actual knowledge standard fails to
confront the situation where the manufacturer is "completely indifferent to
consumer safety."''

Second, he contends that the "actual knowledge"

standard'fails because it does not presume that a manufacturer has "expert
knowledge in its particular field" and therefore is aware of available safety
measures that might reduce the danger its product poses to consumers. 7 2

164. Owen, supra note 104, at 1362-63.
165. Id. at 1364. Owen states that "[m]ost products liability cases articulating
such a standard have adopted traditional punitive damages phraseology, such as 'willful
and wanton,' 'malice, oppression, or gross negligence,' or 'ill will,. . . actual malice,
or... under circumstances amounting to fraud or oppression."' Id.
166. Id. at 1363.
167. Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387, 396-97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
168. Id. at 397.
169. See supra text accompanying note 134.
170. Owen, supra note 104, at 1363.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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The court of appeals addressed both of these issues in Celotex. The court
acknowledged that Missouri courts do not allow a plaintiff to submit a claim
for punitive damages based on a theory that the defendant had "constructive
knowledge" of the product defect or danger. 73 However, the court expanded Missouri law to deal with situations such as Professor Owen's "indifferent
manufacturer." The court stated that it did not rule out affirming an award of
punitive damages where a plaintiff introduced evidence sufficient to put the
defendant on notice of the danger of its product; in other words, the court
might uphold a punitive damages award where a plaintiff proves that
information was available to the defendant that showed that the defendant's
product "was actually known to constitute a health hazard to a given class of
individuals and the defendant consciously chose to ignore the available
information. "

74

The court, however, rejected the application of such a

theory in Celotex, stating that the evidence was insufficient to have put Philip
Carey on such notice. 75
The court also dealt with Professor Owen's proposition'that a manufacturer should be held to an expert knowledge standard in its field and be aware
of the dangers of its product. The court determined that the evidence
produced at trial was insufficient to show that scientific knowledge was
available to Philip Carey from which the dangers of asbestos could be learned:
The record here shows that information in regard to the harmful effect of
asbestos was still developing, but it does not establish that, at the relevant
times herein, there was already information available to show that Philip
Carey's finished products were actually known to present a health hazard
to insulators. In other words, the record does not reflect that scientific
knowledge even existed, at the relevant times herein, to establish legal
causation sufficient to submit punitive damages against Celotex for the
injuries of William Angotti as a result of his exposure, as an insulator, to
Celotex's products. Without even a showing of scientific knowledge
sufficient to establish legal causation, Celotex can not be held to have had
actual knowledge of
the danger to William Angotti on the basis of the
176
record in this case.

The court of appeals was willing to hold Philip Carey to a standard of expert
knowledge of the dangers of asbestos. However, in holding Philip Carey to
this standard, the court required the plaintiffs to prove that "scientific
knowledge" was available to Philip Carey at the time of Angotti's exposure.

173.
174.
175.
176.

Celotex, 812 S.W.2d at 746.
Idat 746-47.
Id.
Id.
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The plaintiffs' failure to meet this burden of proof resulted in the reversal of
the punitive damages award.
D. What Might a Post-Celotex Court of Appeals Require
for Punitive Damages in a ProductsLiability Case?
What is the lasting effect of Celotex? In a narrow sense, Celotex has
expanded the scope of the punitive damages claim in a products liability
action. By confronting Professor Owen's objection to the "actual knowledge"
standard, the court actually tempers M.A.I. 10.04. The Western District of the
Missouri Court of Appeals now appears to be willing to accept a level of
proof below that of "actual knowledge" to satisfy M.A.I. 10.04. The court
indicates that it might affirm a punitive damages award upon proof that the
defendant had information which showed the "health hazard" its product posed
to a specific group.177 The information would put the defendant on notice
of the dangers of its product.'78 The standard, however, remains a difficult
burden for a plaintiff to meet; the information about a product's health hazard
must be backed up by "scientific knowledge." Mere forecasts of danger,
awareness of potential liability from the product, and incidents of disease or
accidents resulting from the product are insufficient to put the defendant on
such notice. 79
Therefore, the practical effect of the standard places a great burden of
proof on an injured plaintiff. In his dissent, Judge Kennedy recognized this
heavy burden, stating that the effect of the Celotex opinion is "that defendant's
knowledge of the defective product's danger, in order to justify a punitive
damages submission, is not merely 'actual' knowledge, but is specific, exact
and certain knowledge."'18 Judge Kennedy was willing to infer that Philip
Carey had actual knowledge that asbestos was dangerous to insulators because
Philip Carey knew of asbestos' hazardous effects. 8 ' The court in Fischer
v. Johns-Manville Corp. was also willing to make that inference."' However, the majority in Celotex was unwilling to make such a jump. Instead, the
court requires more exacting evidence of a defendant's knowledge.
What "scientific knowledge" could the plaintiff have produced in order
to prove that information was available to Philip Carey about health hazards
to insulators? Certainly this standard would be satisfied by the type of

177. Id. at 746.
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 66-72.
180. Celotex, 812 S.W.2d at 752.
181. See supra note 78.
182. Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 472 A.2d 577, 580 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
1984), affid, 512 A.2d 466 (N.J. 1986).
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"smoking gun" that existed in the Grimshaw case. But evidence of knowledge
and malice of this level is rarely found. Some guidance is provided by Wolf
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.."s The Western District of the Missouri
Court of Appeals upheld the punitive damages award in Wolf, the court was
persuaded by evidence that proved an affirmative admission by the defendant
that its product was dangerous."' Therefore, the court of appeals likely
would have upheld the punitive damages award if the plaintiffs had produced
evidence that proved that Philip Carey acknowledged that asbestos posed a
danger to insulators. However, absent evidence of such an affirmative
admission, the plaintiff had the burden of proving that "scientific knowledge"
existed from which Philip Carey knew or should have known that asbestos
was dangerous to insulators. This was a great burden on the plaintiffs-one
which they could not meet-yet it represents a retreat from the burden of
proving true actual knowledge.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Celotex opinion is the result of the conservative standard of M.A.I.
10.04. It shows the reluctance of Missouri courts to recognize punitive
damages in a products liability setting. Missouri Approved Instruction 10.04
is an exacting standard; it not only requires a plaintiff to prove a manufacturer
"showed complete indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of
others," but also that the manufacturer had knowledge of the product's defect
or danger. In this respect, M.A.I. 10.04 presents a more difficult barrier to
punitive damages than the more subjective standards of other jurisdictions.
What makes the barrier much more difficult to overcome is the conservative
approach Missouri courts have taken in interpreting M.A.I. 10.04. One result
that is clear, at least in the Western District of Missouri, is that a plaintiff
likely cannot recover punitive damages without proving that actual scientific
knowledge of the product's danger was available to the defendant. While it
remains a difficult burden, the Western District has slightly lowered the barrier
separating plaintiffs from a punitive damages award.
CHRISTOPHER P. RACKERS

183. 808 S.W.2d 868 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
184. Id. at 872-73.
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